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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Modern developments in technology and business have made the 
world a place where people are more connected and businesses are 
more competitive than ever.1  An individual’s ability to interact and do 
business with almost any entity around the globe has made the modern 
commercial world a flat plane where businesses and people are easily 
able to compete among each other.2 As the global economy expands, 
trademark becomes more important in the commercialized world 
because brands are crossing borders to new markets and people are 
 
1. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds., 1st rev. 
and expanded ed. 2005) (arguing that developments in technology and business practices 
have led to a level playing field for individuals to interact and compete on a global scale). 
2. Id. at 8 (“The global competitive playing field was being leveled.  The world was 
being flattened.”). 
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crossing borders to find new brands more than ever. 
Despite these evolving commercial interactions, trademark laws 
remain restrained by the territoriality principle.3  The territoriality 
principle holds that an entity must undertake the appropriate means to 
gain trademark protection within a jurisdiction for the jurisdiction to 
offer its trademark protections.4  In other words, “[t]he territoriality 
principles requires the use to be in the United States” for the mark to 
garner United States’ trademark protections.5  Although countries 
outside of the United States abide by the principle of territoriality, most 
other countries rely on registration rather than use to secure trademark 
rights.6  The famous marks doctrine provides an exception in most 
countries.  Article 6bis of the Paris Convention and Article 16.2 of the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) 
Agreement protect well-known marks not registered or used in a 
country where protection is sought.7  Currently, United States federal 
courts are split as to whether the famous marks doctrine can protect 
foreign marks under the Lanham Act.8  Most courts hold that the Paris 
Convention is not self-executing9 and courts uniformly hold the TRIPS 
 
3. The territoriality principle originated with the Supreme Court’s decision in A. 
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).  In Bourjois, the plaintiff purchased the rights 
to sell and use the trademarks for a certain French face powder in the United States.  Id. at 
690.  The plaintiff re-registered the trademarks in the United States and realized significant 
commercial success through importing the French products and selling them using 
“substantially the same form of box and label” as the previous owner.  Id. at 691.  The 
defendant sought to profit from a favorable rate of exchange between France and the United 
States by purchasing the same powder in France and re-selling the products in America in 
“boxes which closely resemble those used by the plaintiff . . . .”  Id.  The Court rejected the 
argument that the defendant’s use of the trademark was protected because it “truly 
indicate[d] the origin of the goods.”  Id. at 692.  Rather, the Court found the trademark was 
solely the plaintiff’s to use in the United States and was protected by United States trademark 
laws.  Id.  The public attributed the plaintiff as the source of the goods at issue through the 
trademark and therefore the court reversed the lower court’s decision.  Id. 
4. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2007).  The territoriality 
principle contrasts from the universality principle, which holds that “a trademark serves the 
sole purpose of identifying the source of a product” and it “is valid if it correctly identifies the 
origin or source of the product, regardless of where the consumer purchases the product.”  
Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Jerome Gilson, 1 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 4.05[5] (2004)). 
5. ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d at 155. 
6. 3-10 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 10.02 (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green eds., 
Matthew Bender & Co. 2009)(1974). 
7. Id. at n.2. 
8. 1-3 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.02(b) (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green 
eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009)(1974). 
9. Id. § 3.02(b)(ii)(B). 
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Agreement is not self-executing.10  In particular, it appears that federal 
courts are reluctant to recognize Article 16.2 of TRIPS as applying to 
the United States.11 
Numerous authors have addressed whether a flat world is best suited 
to stringently adhere to the territoriality principle.  In the United States, 
some authors argue for Congress to adopt legislation dropping the 
territoriality principle or at least recognizing exceptions to it.12  Other 
authors argue for courts to take action and adopt exceptions to the 
territoriality principle on public policy grounds.13  With these arguments 
in mind, intellectual property is confronting difficult problems in 
determining who possesses a trademark that is concurrently used by 
separate entities. 
While the battle over territoriality looms, a rising discussion in 
intellectual property law is taking place that addresses whether 
intellectual property should be legally analyzed as real property.14  For 
example, Henry Smith argues that “intellectual property’s close 
relationship to property stems from the role that information costs play 
in the delineation and enforcement of rights.”15  Additionally, Richard 
 
10. Id. 
11. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2007), Grupo 
Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Article 6bis itself 
does not create additional substantive rights.”). 
12. See James Faris, Note, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle 
in American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 451 (2009) (advocating for Congress 
to create a famous marks exception to the territoriality principle through legislation) and 
Kristin Zobel, Comment, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known Foreign 
Marks Receive Trademark Protection Within the United States?, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008) (arguing that adoption or rejection of the famous marks doctrine 
should come from Congress and not the Supreme Court). 
13. Jeffrey M. Reichard & Sam Sneed, The Famous Marks Doctrine: A Call for 
American Courts to Grant Trademark Rights to Famous Foreign Marks, 9 WAKE FOREST 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 85 (2009) (arguing federal courts should adopt the famous marks doctrine 
on public policy grounds). 
14. The Supreme Court most recently recognized “The Lanham Act may well contain 
provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property interests—notably, its provisions 
dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the ‘property’ of the owner because he 
can exclude others from using them.”  College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaidpostsecondary Ed. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999).  This Comment, however, follows years of widely 
different interpretations of trademarks as property. 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 
1.03[7][a] (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009)(1974).  
See also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1846–47 (2007) (“[C]ritics almost universally characterize modern 
doctrines as indicative of a shift in trademark law away from confusion-based protection and 
towards a property-based regime that is focused only superficially on consumers.”). 
15. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1745 (2007) (“[I]ntellectual property’s close relationship to 
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Epstein applies rules of acquisition, exclusion, and duration of property 
to intellectual property.16  Sheldon Halpern acknowledges the 
movement toward treating trademarks as property but argues that the 
implications strongly stand in disfavor of this conclusion.17  Two 
controversial trademark cases add to this discussion and demonstrate 
that at least famous trademarks should be examined as property.  The 
next question, however, is how does one possess a trademark when it is 
treated as property? 
This Comment engages in that jurisprudential analysis through the 
lens of two of the most famous property acquisition theories.  Part II 
explains the tensions in trademark law when it is based on a tort theory 
of recovery through the Malaysian case McCurry Restaurant v. 
McDonald’s Corp.18  This Comment will then demonstrate how this 
tension is resolved by relying on treating a trademark as property in 
Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co.19  Part III concludes that in a 
global economy, the Lockean theory of possessing property best applies 
to trademarks treated as property.  In a utopian society, made possible 
by virtual worlds like Second Life, individuals should rely on a 
Blackstone approach.  
II.  MCCURRY RESTAURANT V. MCDONALD’S CORP. AND GRUPO 
GIGANTE SA DE CV V. DALLO & CO.: TOWARD TREATING 
TRADEMARK AS REAL PROPERTY 
Trademark protections originated in the context of torts.20  As 
trademark law developed, mark owners began to claim an interest in the 
mark itself21 and trademark protections moved beyond the concern of 
 
property stems from the role that information costs play in the delineation and enforcement 
of rights.”). 
16. Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 
IND. L.J. 803 (2001) (applying property rules to the different forms of intellectual property). 
17. Sheldon W. Halpern, Trafficking in Trademarks: Setting Boundaries for the Uneasy 
Relationship Between “Property” Rights and Trademark and Publicity Rights, 5–6, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120370 (arguing that if trademark is treated as property, then 
“trademark owners, the branding enterprises, will inevitably seek to expand the strength, 
power and scope of trademarks”). 
18. Rayuan Sivil No. W-02-1037-2006. 
19. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
20. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:7 (4th ed. 2009) (“Since trademark infringement is a type of unfair 
competition and unfair competition is a tort, it follows that trademark infringement is a 
commercial tort.”). 
21. Id. § 2:1 (“Some scholars have criticized modern expansions in trademark law as 
treating trademarks as property, inconsistent with the historical focus on trademark law on 
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consumer confusion.22  The disadvantages for mark owners in treating 
trademarks as a tort theory are prevalent in the Malaysian case of 
McCurry Restaurant v. McDonald’s Corp.23  The problem for mark 
owners is resolved, however, when the property concept of dilution is 
introduced to the trademark context.  This solution is demonstrated by 
the American case of Grupo Gigante v. Dallo.24  While treating 
trademarks as property may relieve these tensions, the question 
becomes how one can possess a property interest in trademark. 
A.  McCurry Restaurant v. McDonald’s Corp. and the Problems with 
Trademark as Tort 
One of the consequences of a world that is able to communicate and 
travel between distant lands is that successful businesses are entering 
new geographic territories.25  Take, for example, McDonald’s 
restaurants.26  McDonald’s first opened its doors in 1940 in San 
Bernardino, California.27  Since that time, McDonald’s has grown to a 
level of unprecedented fame throughout the world.28  Today 
McDonald’s has more than 30,000 locations spread across 118 
countries.29  Once an exclusively American company, McDonald’s now 
 
the protection of consumers from confusion and deception.”). 
22. Halpern, supra note 17, at 3 (“[M]odern trademark disputes, particularly those that 
have arisen since the advent of the Internet, are not limited to the traditional ‘unfair 
competition’ context.”). 
23. Rayuan Sivil No. W-02-1037-2006. 
24. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
25. See Friedman, supra note 1 at 9–10.  Friedman describes a period of time referred 
to as “Globalization 2.0” (of 3.0) as the development of countries competing on a global 
scale.  In contrast, Globalization 1.0 is represented by countries driving global integration and 
Globalization 3.0 is defined by individuals competing on a global scale. 
26. While McDonald’s offers an example of a business physically establishing itself in a 
new territory, a second type of example is commercial transactions that occur through the 
internet.  Internet product sales constitute a significant part of the global economy.  For 
instance, Amazon.com, a leading internet-based retail giant, posted international sales of 
$2.59 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008.  Amazon.com profit surges, CHI. TRIB., Jan., 31, 
2008, at C2. 
27. McDonald’s.com, Travel Through Time With Us!, 
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/our_company/mcd_history.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
28. The judge in McCurry Restaurant v. McDonald’s Corp. (described below) even 
characterized McDonald’s by including, “Everyone knows or has heard of ‘McDonald’s.’”  
McCurry Rest. v. McDonald’s Corp., Rayuan Sivil No. W-02-1037-2006, at 1.   
29. Randy James, A Brief History of McDonald’s Abroad, TIME, Oct. 28, 2009, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1932839,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-
sidebar.   
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does over $23.5 billion in international business.30   
In 2002 a little Malaysian restaurant called McCurry challenged that 
fame.31  McCurry was also a restaurant, but it sold Indian and Malaysian 
cuisine.32  McDonald’s sued McCurry in Malaysian court challenging its 
use of the “Mc” trademark in the McCurry name.33  Throughout the suit, 
the owners of McCurry claimed that their use of “Mc” stood for 
“Malaysian Chicken Curry.”34  The trial court initially ruled in 
McDonald’s favor and ordered the “Mc” removed from McCurry.35 
On appeal, the court explained that the issue presented was whether 
McCurry created a false impression to its customers that its goods, 
mark, or business was that of McDonald’s.36  The court determined that 
McCurry did not misrepresent its restaurant as associated with 
McDonald’s.37  First, there was no semblance between the McCurry and 
McDonald’s trademarks.38  Whereas McDonald’s logo consisted of the 
famous golden arches, McCurry used “Restoran McCurry” and included 
“a picture of a chicken giving a double thumbs up . . . .”39  Second, the 
use of “Mc” did not go beyond the sign in front of McCurry.40  While 
McDonald’s extensively used the “Mc” prefix on all of its menu items, 
McCurry did not use the “Mc” mark so extensively.41  Third, the food 
offered at each establishment was significantly different.42  Unlike 
McDonald’s fast food, McCurry offered “typically Indian food.”43  
Finally, the clientele of McDonald’s and McCurry was also significantly 
different.44  The court found McDonald’s primarily catered to children 
 
30. Blake Ellis, McDonald’s Wins With Global Palates, CNN.COM, July 13, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/10/news/companies/mcdonalds_global_international_menu.fort
une/index.htm.   
31. Baradan Kuppusamy & Kuala Lumpur, McCurry: The Indian Eatery that Beat 
McDonald’s, TIME, Sept. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article10,8599,1921124,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-sidebar.   
32. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 1.   
33. Id. at 2. 
34.  Kuppusamy & Lumpur, supra note 31.   
35. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 2.  See also Kuppusamy & Lumpur, supra note 
31.   
36. Id. at 7. 
37. Id. at 10. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 10–11. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 11. 
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while McCurry’s clients were mainly adults.45  Therefore, despite 
operating in Malaysia since 1982 with a total of 137 restaurants,46 
McDonald’s was helpless to stop McCurry from using “Mc.” 
The McCurry case demonstrates that relying on a tort-based theory 
to enforce trademarks does not provide sufficient remedies for global 
companies in the modern economy.  The Malaysian court’s analysis 
focused on a passing off claim that was defined by how the consuming 
public interpreted the mark.47  This tort claim did not recognize the 
interest McDonald’s has in the mark itself.  McDonald’s must prevent 
others from capitalizing on using the mark so it does not become 
generic.48  McDonald’s loses the right to claim trademark protections in 
its mark once a McDonald’s mark becomes generic through common 
use.49 
The interest McDonald’s holds in excluding other entities from using 
its marks to maintain their protected status demonstrates why 
trademark law must recognize trademarks as a form of real property.  
The right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property . . . .” 50  Without 
acknowledging that McDonald’s has a right to exclude others from using 
its marks to prevent the mark from becoming generic, McDonald’s must 
rely on consumer confusion to defend its mark.  In McCurry, the court 
overturned a lower judge’s ruling that “[w]hen ‘Mc’ is used in 
conjunction with a food item, the first impression or the first thing that 
 
45. Id. 
46. Julia Zappei, McDonald’s Loses Trademark Fight Against Malaysia’s McCurry, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/08/mcdonalds-
loses-trademark_n_279089.html.  
47. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 7 (quoting Mun Loong Co Sdn Bhd v. Chai 
Tuck Kin [1982] CLJ 80). 
48. Once a mark becomes so common that it is no longer identified to a particular 
source, it becomes generic and no longer receives the protections of trademark law.  
MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at § 12:1.  Courts have declared several marks generic and no 
longer subject to trademark protection, including “pilates” (Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, 
120 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)), “yo-yo” (Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. 
Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965)), and “trampoline” (Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. 
Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961).  See also Regina Nelson Eng, A 
Likelihood of Infringement the Purchase and Sale of Trademarks as Adwords, 18 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 493, 532–33 (2008) (describing aspirin, escalator, and trampoline as once 
protected marks that became generic “through popular use”). 
49. MCCARTHY, supra note 20. 
50. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding Government had to 
compensate marina owner pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to force 
public access to the marina). 
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comes to mind is McDonald’s and the plaintiff.”51  Instead, the court 
ruled that “Mc” associated with the type of Indian food served by the 
McCurry restaurant would not create the necessary confusion to order 
McCurry to discontinue use of the mark.52  Forcing trademark owners to 
rely on the interpretations of the consuming public, however, leaves a 
mark owner like McDonald’s without the sufficient ability to prevent its 
mark from becoming generic within the international context.  A 
trademark defense that is based on tort allows non-owners significant 
leeway to use a mark before it becomes unlawful infringement but also 
may gradually lead to making a mark generic so the mark is no longer 
protectable.53 
B.  Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co. 
A second consequence of living in a flat world is that customers who 
associate a mark with a business often cross into a new territory that has 
not yet received the mark through use or registration.54  The Ninth 
Circuit confronted this problem in Grupo Gigante Sa de CV v. Dallo & 
Co., Inc.55  Unlike the McCurry court, the Ninth Circuit in Grupo 
Gigante was able to craft a remedy for that gave the famous mark owner 
the ability to protect its mark through a property theory of recovery.56  
This solution offers strong support for treating trademarks as property 
so mark owners may fully protect their interests in a mark. 
The plaintiff, Grupo Gigante, was a popular grocery store chain in 
Mexico that began in the early 1960s.57  Grupo Gigante registered 
GIGANTE as a trade name in Mexico and by 1991 had almost 100 
 
51. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 12. 
52. Id. at 13. 
53. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 12:1 n.12 (citing BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational 
Corp., 60 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding AT&T’s failure to defend the “Walking Fingers” 
logo led the public to associate the mark generally with classified telephone directories)). 
54. The World Tourism Organization estimates there were 922 million international 
tourist arrivals throughout the world in 2008.  International Tourist Arrivals by (Sub)region, 
UNWTO WORLD TOURISM BAROMETER, Oct. 2009, at 5, 
http://unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom09_3_en_excerpt.pdf. 
55. Grupo Gigante Sa de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).  See 
also Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Restaurant & Café, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529 (1936) (defendants 
attempted to establish restaurants under the guise of plaintiff’s French restaurant that had yet 
to establish a presence in New York); Louis Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 
(1959) (same); All Eng. Law Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, Inc. 220 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 1069 (1983) (plaintiff British corporation opposed defendant’s attempt to register the 
mark “Wimbledon Cologne” in the United States). 
56. Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1097–98. 
57. Id. at 1091. 
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stores in operation in Mexico with several near the California border.58  
In August 1991, the defendant, Dallo, began operating a grocery store in 
San Diego under the name “Gigante Market.”59  Although at the time 
Dallo’s “Gigante Market” opened Grupo Gigante had yet to establish a 
presence in the United States, Grupo Gigante attempted to do so in 
1998.60  Grupo Gigante was not able to convince Dallo to give up the 
Gigante name in a June 1998 meeting, but Grupo Gigante registered the 
Gigante name with the state of California in the same month.61 
The Ninth Circuit protected Grupo Gigante’s use of the “Gigante” 
mark by recognizing a famous marks exception to the territoriality 
principle of trademark law.62  The Ninth Circuit went directly to the 
heart of the original intent of trademark law by declaring that “[a]n 
absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would 
promote consumer confusion and fraud.”63  In the Grupo Gigante 
circumstances, the court was specifically concerned with “[c]ommerce 
[that] crosses borders” through Mexican immigrants crossing America’s 
borders.64   
The Ninth Circuit relied on a secondary meaning plus analysis to 
avoid allowing the famous marks doctrine to entirely swallow the 
territoriality principle.65  The court wanted to adhere to the territoriality 
principle because of “the lack of a uniform trademark regime across 
international borders” and the language within the Paris Convention 
 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. Dallo followed Grupo Gigante’s actions by also registering the Gigante name 
with California a month later in July of 1998.  Id. at 1092.  Neither party, however, registered 
the Gigante name federally with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  Id. 
62. Id. at 1094. 
63. Id.  Although the court acknowledged no other federal circuit authority adopted a 
famous marks exception, it cited to the New York decision in Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc. 
for support of the doctrine.  Id. at 1094–95. 
64. Id. at 1094. 
65. Id. at 1097–98.  The Grupo Gigante court considered the level of fame required to 
receive trademark protection through a famous marks exception to the territoriality principle 
to be significant.  The court noted the lack of a clear and uniform standard to apply to 
determine whether a mark was famous enough to qualify for the exception.  Id. at 1095.  
Specifically, Vaudable from the New York courts and the Patent and Trademark Office’s 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board both lacked a clear standard describing the level of fame 
necessary to qualify for the exception.  The court noted that the famous marks exception is 
unlikely to apply to duplicating a purely local, small business mark.  Id. at 1094–95.  The court 
did not agree with the district court, however, which only used secondary meaning to define 
how famous a mark had to be before it was granted priority.  Id. at 1095–99.   
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that supported maintaining the principle.66  To this end, the court’s 
secondary meaning plus analysis required not only proof of a connection 
in consumer’s minds between the product or service and its source, but 
additionally required proof “by a preponderance of the evidence, that a 
substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market 
were familiar with the foreign mark.”67  The court considered several 
factors to determine whether a mark was sufficiently famous, including 
“intentional copying of the mark” and “whether customers of the 
American firm are likely to think they are patronizing the same firm 
that uses the mark in another country,” though neither was held to be 
determinative.68 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Grupo Gigante endorses treating 
trademarks as property.  The famous marks exception allows the mark 
owner to bring a dilution claim of infringement against junior users.  
Under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, an American trademark owner 
can bring a claim of dilution by blurring.69  Dilution by blurring 
recognizes that an infringing mark that is similar to a famous mark 
“impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”70  Unlike traditional 
trademark infringement, which requires the mark owner to demonstrate 
a likelihood of confusion, dilution by blurring does not require proof of 
a likelihood of confusion or show actual economic injury.71 
A dilution by blurring claim interprets trademarks as property 
because it gives the owner of a famous mark the ability to exclude 
others from using that mark.72  Unlike the previous understanding of 
trademark theory that relied on consumer confusion, dilution claims 
give trademark owners a direct interest in the mark.73  Dilution claims 
allow mark owners to protect the inherent value that lies in a trademark 
by preventing others from reducing that value.74  Through recognizing 
 
66. Id. at 1098. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
71. 3-11 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 11.07[3] (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green 
eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009) (1974). 
72. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999) (arguing that dilution laws represent one form of “doctrinal 
creep” in which trademark has taken on aspects of property theory). 
73. See id. 
74. Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of 
Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5–9 (2006) (examining the differences between 
traditional understandings of trademark law and dilution claims under trademark law).  See 
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dilution claims, trademark law in the United States appropriately 
evolved to meet the needs of famous trademark owners because of the 
enormous amount of money that can be at stake.75  Giving trademark 
owners the ability to exclude others from using a famous mark not only 
recognizes the monetary value of the mark but also supports treating a 
mark as real property. 
With an understanding that trademark developed to be considered 
analogous to property, an important question remains left unanswered 
as to how one theoretically possesses a trademark.  John Locke and 
William Blackstone are two important property theorists that offer 
contrasting yet plausible views how acquisition of a trademark as 
property can function. 
III.  LOCKE FOR REALITY AND BLACKSTONE FOR UTOPIA 
In her 1985 essay, Carol Rose explains how an individual possesses 
property.76  Rose assumes that first possession is the “root” of property 
ownership in the common law.77  In her analysis, Rose principally relies 
on two theories to explain how one possesses property: “(1) notice to 
the world through a clear act, and (2) reward to useful labor.”78  The 
fathers of these theories are very familiar to property scholars and 
should surprise no one; the clear act principle is attributed to William 
Blackstone,79 while John Locke articulated the labor theory of property 
possession.80  Through analyzing Blackstone’s and Locke’s theories, one 
can understand the underlying assumptions of how real property is 
assigned to owners so those assumptions can be applied to trademarks.  
This analysis demonstrates that the Lockean labor theory best applies to 
trademarks as real property because of the knowledge the consuming 
public carries with them to any given market.  In a utopian world where 
individuals confront all marks for the first time, however, the 
Blackstone clear-act principle prevails. 
 
also Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 312 (2003) (“[A] 
standard of dilution based solely on a mark conjuring another reflects a view that a famous 
mark has a singular association in people’s minds and is entitled to protection against any 
background noise that might interfere with the purity of that association.”). 
75. See Manning, supra note 74, at 8.  Manning discusses the example of PepsiCo that 
paid $13.4 billion for Quaker Oats principally for the Gatorade brand name. 
76. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L REV. 73 (1985). 
77. Id. at 75. 
78. Id. at 77.   
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 73–74. 
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A.  Locke—Labor Theory 
Locke’s premise of how one comes to possess property is considered 
one of the founding theories in property law.81  He begins from the 
premise that God bestowed land unto mankind.82  Locke then relies on 
an individual’s labor to define how one possesses property.83 
Locke’s labor theory assumes that an individual possesses his or her 
body.84  Because an individual has an exclusive interest in his body, the 
individual holds a similar interest in the work or labor that body 
completes.85  Locke explains, “Whatsoever then [man] removes out of 
the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his Property.”86  When an individual’s labor mixes with an 
object that exists in nature, the individual removes the property from its 
natural state to make it his or her own.87  Removing objects from their 
natural state in this way “begins the Property.”88  Once an individual has 
 
81. See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 371 (2003) (examining how Locke’s labor theory uses the right to exclude to define 
property as distinguished from the modern bundle and exclusion theories of property).  While 
most consider Locke to be one of the foundational theorists when describing property rights, 
some argue that his Second Treatise of Government does not describe property rights at all.  
Rather, Locke merely describes “possession or appropriation with no real title.”  Paul 
Thomas, Property’s Properties: From Hegel to Locke, 84 REPRESENTATIONS 30, 38 (2003). 
Although the distinction is noteworthy and may be important to arguments on rights after 
acquisition, it is not relevant to this discussion. 
82. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 286 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).  For Locke, God plays a major role in creating and 
giving purpose to property.  Locke later comments, “[I]t cannot be supposed [God] meant 
[property] should always remain common and uncultivated.  He gave it to the use of the 
Industrious and Rational, . . . not to the Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and 
Contentious.”  Id. at 291.  Locke was not the only property theorist to start from this premise 
of how property first developed as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf also took a similar 
position.  Mossoff, supra note 81, at 376. 
83. Locke, supra note 82, at 288. 
84. Id. at 287.  See also Thomas, supra note 81, at 38 for a discussion on criticisms of 
Locke’s assumption of self-possession. 
85. Locke, supra note 82, at 287–88. 
86. Id. at 288.  Labor represents the answer to Locke’s quintessential problem of how 
to derive individual property rights from property that was held in common.  Mossoff, supra 
note 81, at 386 (“Locke is confronted with the quandary of how to derive property from 
common use-rights without the device of consent.”).  Mossoff notes that in another of 
Locke’s works he wrote that “God’s original grant ‘was not to Adam in particular, exclusive 
of all other Men: whatever Dominion he had thereby, it was not a Private Dominion, but a 
Dominion in common with the rest of Mankind.’”  Id. 
87. Locke, supra note 82, at 288.  
88. Id. at 288–89. 
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acquired property, he or she is free to take advantage of its benefits.89 
Locke places important limits on one’s ability to possess property 
through the concept of waste.  Just as an individual is free to possess 
that which he or she can acquire through labor, an individual is 
susceptible to lose that which he or she wastes.90  Locke demonstrates 
this point by noting “if either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the 
ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and 
laying up, this part of the Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still 
to be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any other.”91  
Therefore, where one does not take advantage of that which he or she 
has labored over, then his or her possessory interest in that property is 
lost.92 
Locke’s approach is consistent with the principles of trademark 
because a potential mark owner must work to create an association 
between itself and the mark to gain protection in the mark.  A 
trademark owner works to establish an association between the mark 
and the owner so consumers know what kind of product they are 
purchasing and from whom they are purchasing it.  The labor a mark 
owner puts into creating that association is tied to the labor that Locke 
discusses above.  The reputation built through labor best represents the 
original purpose of trademark law: to prevent consumer confusion.93  
The reputation necessary to gain trademark protection, however, is not 
built in a day because consumers need time to build the association in 
their minds.94  Therefore, Locke better relies on the passive association 
 
89. Id. at 290.  See also Mossoff, supra note 81, at 389 (“By mixing something one 
already owns—labor—with an object in the commons, the resulting product is, morally 
speaking, removed from the commons and itself becomes exclusively owned, i.e., it becomes 
property.”). 
90. Id. at 295. 
91. Id. 
92. Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence 
of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential 
Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 712–13 (2003) (discussing Locke’s view on the failure to 
take advantage of property as waste and violation of the Law of Nature).  See also Carol M. 
Rose, “Enough, and as Good” of What?, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 417, n.72 (“Locke’s mode of 
preserving plenitude was the prohibition against waste . . . .”). 
93. See Halpern, supra note 17. 
94. In this regard, trademark may be analogous to forming a habit.  Many famously 
believe that it takes 28 days to develop a new habit.  However, studies show it can take three 
times that amount of time to form a new habit.  Oliver Burkeman, This column will change 
your life: How long does it really take to change a habit, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2009, 
www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2009/oct/10/change-your-life-habit-28-day-rule.  Considering 
one is unlikely to confront a trademark as routinely as a person committed to learning a new 
habit, it seems safe to assume that the period of time necessary to learn brand name 
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that builds between a mark and its owner in consumers’ minds through 
use of the mark rather than an active declaration by a mark owner. 
Further, Locke’s concept of waste is well-suited to apply to 
trademark because it coincides with trademark’s purpose to prevent 
consumer confusion and to protect the goodwill of a mark owner.  
Where the mark owner does not maintain efforts to help keep the 
association between a mark and its source strong in the minds of 
consumers, the purpose of protecting that mark is lost and it becomes 
generic.95  In such a case, a mark owner appropriately loses its interest in 
a mark because consumers are no longer duped into purchasing one 
good or service while erroneously believing it is from a different source 
because the mark no longer correlates to a singular source.96   
The facts in the Malaysian McCurry case demonstrate why the 
Lockean labor theory is best suited to apply to trademark law.97  Locke’s 
labor theory relies on the mark owner sufficiently working with the 
mark to gain an ownership interest in it.  McDonald’s significantly 
mixed its labor by building its presence in the Malaysian market by 
opening 137 restaurants throughout the country.  Over the course of 
more than two decades, McDonald’s established in customers minds 
that the “Mc” at a fast food hamburger restaurant indicated 
McDonald’s goods and services would be sold. 
The Malaysian court’s opinion fits well with the Lockean theory of 
possessing property because it identifies the limits to McDonald’s labor 
with the “Mc” mark when trademark is not viewed as property.  Rather 
than grant McDonald’s carte blanche over using “Mc,” the court 
identified several distinctions with McCurry’s use of the mark that 
prevented consumer confusion.  McDonald’s did not work to associate 
in consumer’s minds the “Mc” mark with a chicken giving the thumbs 
up or Indian food.  Rather, McCurry was working to establish this 
relationship and had the right to use the “Mc” mark in this manner.  
While the court recognized that McDonald’s labored to establish a 
 
recognition is longer. 
95. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20. 
96. See id. 
97. Like the United States, Malaysia has a trademark registry but it is not necessary to 
register a mark to gain some trademark protections.  IntellectFront.com, Malaysia 
Trademark—Registration and Search Information, 
http://www.intellectfront.com/info/malaysia-trademark.html#information (last visited Apr. 6, 
2010).  There is nothing in the Malaysian court’s decision to indicate whether McDonald’s 
previously registered the “Mc” mark with Malaysian authorities.  Additionally, as 
McDonald’s based its claim on a “passing off” suit, it is likely that it did not register its mark. 
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sufficient link between “Mc” and fast food,98 this link was not the focus 
of McCurry’s labor.  Therefore, under Locke’s theory of property 
acquisition, the Malaysian court appropriately recognized that 
McDonald’s did not have sufficient trademark protections to exclude 
McCurry’s use of the “Mc” mark. 
Locke’s labor theory of acquiring property better explains 
acquisition of the trademark in the Grupo Gigante case as well.  Grupo 
Gigante worked for decades to establish the Gigante mark as the name 
for Grupo Gigante goods and services by creating hundreds of stores 
throughout Mexico.  Because Grupo Gigante expanded throughout 
Mexico, many Mexicans recognized the Gigante name and associated 
that name with Grupo Gigante’s products.  When individuals who knew 
the Gigante mark in Mexico left for the United States, they carried with 
them Grupo Gigante’s established reputation with the Gigante mark.  
Without Grupo Gigante’s labor to create and maintain the reputation it 
enjoyed, it would have no interest in claiming a possessory interest in 
the Gigante mark.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit appropriately 
recognized a famous marks exception to the territoriality principle when 
Locke’s labor theory is considered the means of establishing a property 
interest in a trademark. 
B.  Blackstone’s Clear-Act Principle 
As one of the principal sources for understanding common law 
doctrines, William Blackstone has gained certain notoriety among legal 
scholars.99  Blackstone’s principal legacy comes from the ideas he 
espoused in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.100  Blackstone 
famously explained property as “that sole and despotic dominion which 
one claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”101 
 
98. See McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 10–11. 
99. See Mossoff, supra note 81, at 397–403 (using Blackstone to explain the integrate 
theory of property), Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly 
Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 9 (1987) (examining the influence of 
Blackstone and other theorists on the founding fathers’ vision for America) and Shelby D. 
Green, Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REV. 245, 250–51 
(2003) (using Blackstone to explain the foundations of property in the common law). 
100. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 
(Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publ’g Ltd. 2001) (1765-1769). 
101. Id. at 3.  Mossoff notes that where Blackstone relies on exclusion to define 
property in Volume II of Comentaries, this approach differs significantly from his Volume I 
of the Commentaries where he relied on “free use, enjoyment, and disposal” to define 
property.  Mossoff, supra note 81, at 398. 
DILL 5.17.10 5/26/2010  1:32 PM 
386 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
Blackstone, like Locke, began by presuming that in the beginning all 
the world was held by everyone as common property.102  Initially, any 
person’s dominion over property was determined by its use.103  As man’s 
numbers in population grew, however, a more permanent dominion was 
necessary.104  Thus, the rule of first possession was born to determine 
who had rights to property.105  Blackstone then explained that possessing 
property required “a declaration that [a person] intends to appropriate 
the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of universal 
law, till such time as he does some other act which shows an intention to 
abandon it[.]”106  Rose describes Blackstone’s act of declaring a 
possessory interest in property as the “clear-act principle.”107  Therefore, 
if one can communicate to a relevant audience that he or she is the first 
to possess a piece of property, then that individual has a right to own 
that property. 
Blackstone’s theory may seem difficult to apply to trademark for 
two reasons.  First, like Locke, Blackstone begins with the premise that 
land was given from a higher power to all of man.108  This basis implies 
that the property Blackstone addressed had certain boundaries to it.  
However, trademark is not so definite because it is based on language.  
Language is not forced to adhere to the boundaries that real property is 
required to adhere.  An individual cannot claim to possess a piece of 
real property today that they could not have claimed to possess 
yesterday because it did not exist.  Additionally, new words are 
continuously added to any language’s vocabulary.109  Over time, cultural 
changes modify or add to the meaning of words.110  Language represents 
 
102. BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 4–5. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 5.  See also James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property 
Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, n.93 (2009) (describing how Blackstone viewed the 
evolution of property rights). 
105. BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 4–5. 
106. Id. at 8. 
107. Rose, supra note 76, at 77. 
108. BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 3–4. 
109. In 2009 Merriam-Webster added almost 100 new words including such entries as 
“frenemy,” one who pretends to be a friend but is actually an enemy, and staycation, a 
vacation spent at home or nearby.  Merriam-Webster.com, Planning a staycation this year?, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/newwords09.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
110. With the advent of social networks such as Facebook, “friend” added to its 
definition by becoming a verb (friending) that generally means to be added to one’s social 
networking audience.  See Julia Angwin, How Facebook is Making Friending Obsolete, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126084637203791583.html.  
See also Robert J. Menner, Multiple Meaning and Change of Meaning in English, 21 
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a concept with greater flexibility than real property, which may make 
Blackstone’s clear-act theory difficult to apply to trademarks. 
 Second, Blackstone’s clear-act theory of possession is difficult to 
apply to trademarks because he does not make clear what gesture is 
sufficient to constitute a “clear-act” announcing a possessory interest in 
property.  Rose alludes to this problem when she observes that the 
clear-act principle implies that the declarant’s gesture must be received 
by “the relevant audience at the appropriate time.”111  Rose even goes so 
far as to cite copyright and patents as areas where this problem is 
especially prevalent.112  Trademark goes a step further than patents or 
copyright, however, because it is not based on what the potential mark 
owner says or how he or she acts.  Rather, trademarks primarily exist to 
prevent consumer confusion and they are created by the association 
consumers form with a mark.113  While a copyright can rely on when 
words are put to paper114 and patent can similarly rely on when an 
invention is put to practice or filed with the appropriate office,115 
trademark cannot rely on such definitive acts.  An individual could rely 
on use in commerce to protect their trademark,116 but the McCurry case 
demonstrates that use alone does not provide clear boundaries for the 
protections a mark should receive.  Remedies are also available under 
the Lanham Act for infringement against those marks that are not 
registered but their owners have filed an intent to use the mark in 
commerce.117  A mark protected in this way, however, provides no clear-
act for individuals participating in the market, or the “relevant 
audience,” where the mark is yet to present itself through reputation or 
use.  By relying on consumer associations, trademarks are left 
 
LANGUAGE 59 (1945) (discussing the change in meaning of several common English words 
from 700 A.D. to the present). 
111. Rose, supra note 76, at 83. 
112. Id.  Rose is not the only one who is reluctant to apply theories of possession to 
trademark.  See D.B. Resnick, A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property, 46 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 319, 320–21, (2003).  Although Resnick notes that Lockean theory may best be suited 
to apply to trademarks in the IP arena, he only provides fuller criticism of the theory through 
copyright and patent.  Id.   
113. 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03(1) (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green 
eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009) (1974).  See also Halpern, supra note 17. 
114. To gain copyright protection, a work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
115. An inventor seeking to patent an invention must file an application with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office.  Donald S. Chisum, 4–11 Chisum on Patents § 
11.01 (Matthew Bender  & Co. 2010 (1998). 
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). 
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vulnerable to a lack of clear-act that can indicate when a word or phrase 
is possessed. 
C.  Virtual Property—Second Life Offers a Second Chance for 
Blackstone 
The McCurry v. McDonald’s and Grupo Gigante v. Dallo cases 
present situations where the knowledge biases of consumers present too 
great of a challenge for the Blackstone clear-act principle to apply.  
Instead, one must acknowledge the work required to create the 
necessary recognition with a brand to find a mark worthy of trademark 
protection.  A unique situation presents itself with virtual property 
where a population is established and grows in a short amount of time. 
One such virtual world is the popular online three-dimensional 
universe called Second Life.118  Second Life allows individuals to create 
avatars that exist in the Second Life world.119  Once inside, individuals 
can buy Second Life land, create Second Life businesses, and run 
completely Second Life lives.120  Second Life even has its own currency 
system, Linden Dollars, which can be exchanged for real life currency.121  
There are no winners and losers per se in second life, just people living 
out another life. 
Second Life is a significant commercial market with a free flowing 
currency and vast population.122  Second Life’s terms of service, 
however, do not reflect its commercial strength and the terms protect 
intellectual property vaguely at best.123  While Second Life strongly 
 
118. SecondLife.com, Home Page, http://secondlife.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  
Second Life Home Page, http://secondlife.com.  Second Life was created by Linden Lab, a 
company residing in San Francisco, California.  LindenLab.com, Home Page, 
http://lindenlab.com (Apr. 3, 2010). 
119. SecondLife.com, Home Page, http://secondlife.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  
120. Id.  Second Life was even prominently featured in the popular American TV 
show, The Office in the episode entitled Local Ad of Season 4.  TV.com, The Office Season 4 
Episode Guide, http://www.tv.com/the-office/show/22343/episode.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
121. Currency Exchange, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis/currency.php.  
Second Life explains that the exchange rate with U.S. currency has remained fairly stable as 
of late, at a 250 Linden Dollars to 1 U.S. Dollar rate. 
122. Linden Labs reports that in March 2009 there were 732,526 unique residents with 
repeat logs.  Additionally, the Second Life economy topped $120 million U.S. dollars in the 
first quarter of 2009, with 120 million user-to-user transactions.  The Second Life Economy—
First Quarter 2009 in Detail, 
https://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2009/04/16/the-second-life-economy--
first-quarter-2009-in-detail (April 16, 2009, 2:00:54 PM). 
123. See Terms of Service, Second Life, § 7 Content Licenses and Intellectual Property 
Rights, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
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protects Linden Lab’s trademarks,124 users “retain any and all 
Intellectual Property Rights [they] already hold under applicable law . . . 
.”125  This lack of clarity is especially evident considering Second Life 
users come from countries all over the world.126  Second Life does not 
regulate trademark infringement itself or provide a means for resolving 
infringement in the real world.  Several high profile companies, such as 
Coca-Cola and Adidas, conduct business by selling products within the 
Second Life universe, but these companies are susceptible to individuals 
taking advantage of their marks by producing counterfeit goods under 
the same mark.127  While users are attempting to resolve trademark 
issues in Second Life by creating a Second Life Patent and Trademark 
office, this alternative authority is yet to be firmly established.128 
Unsurprisingly, parties seeking to enforce real world trademark 
protections have left Second Life to seek protection in real life courts.  
In Eros, LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., plaintiff Eros brought a class-
action suit alleging Linden Labs provided the tools through Second Life 
for others to infringe on Eros’s real-life trademarks.129  Eros first used 
the SexGen mark in January 2005 and registered the SexGen mark with 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in August 2008.130  Despite 
Linden Lab’s knowledge of widespread trademark infringement, Eros 
claims Linden Lab took no action to prevent parties from purchasing 
“infringing knockoffs of trademarked virtual goods and services,” such 
 
124. See id., § 7.6. Linden Lab owns Intellectual Property Rights in and to the Service, 
except all User Content, and in and to the Linden Marks.  
125. See id., § 7.1. A person retains any and all Intellectual Property Rights he submits 
to the Service.  
126. Max Vern, Second Life—A New Dimension for Trademark Infringement, 90 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 51, 53 (2008) (noting that Second Life avatars are 
controlled by users from more than 100 countries with U.S. residents constituting 30% of the 
population). 
127. See Complaint at 4, Eros, LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., 09-CV-04269-PJH (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 15, 2009).  While Eros points to these examples, trademark infringement may be 
more rampant than one might first guess.  Prior research revealed 16 shops advertising 
FERRARI cars, 40 stores advertising ROLEX and CHANEL watches, 50 stores selling 
GUCCI, PRADA, RAYBAN, and OAKLEY sunglasses.  Further, a search of NIKE under 
the Second Life classifieds reveals 186 hits though Nike does not sell any of these shoes.  Ever 
the present controversy in real life, several stores are selling iPODs loaded with copyright 
infringing songs.  Benjamin Duranske, Rampant Trademark Infringement in Second Life 
Costs Millions, Undermines Future Enforcement, VIRTUALLYBLIND.COM (May 4, 2007), 
http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/05/04/trademark-infringement-vws/.  
128. Vern, supra note 126 at 56. 
129. Complaint, Eros, LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., 09-CV-04269-PJH. 
130. Id. at 11. 
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as Eros’s SexGen virtual beds.131  Not only does Eros claim that Linden 
Lab allowed this infringing activity to take place, but Eros also claims 
that Linden Lab made a profit by charging parties a fee to rent space to 
sell and to upload infringing goods, running a currency exchange with 
exchange fees, operating an online marketplace where infringing goods 
were sold, and operating a classified ads system where infringing goods 
were advertised for sale.132  As a result of illicit merchants selling Eros’s 
products, Eros’s claims consumer confusion as to the origin of goods 
and harm to Eros’s good reputation within the Second Life 
community.133 
Creating trademarks in virtual worlds that are based on the real 
world presents a unique problem for determining who possesses a 
trademark.  The inhabitants of a virtual world such as Second Life are 
controlled by real life individuals who bring certain source-trademark 
knowledge through participating in real world markets.  Virtual world 
inhabitants uniquely enter their virtual territories and markets with 
developed associations between trademarks and their sources.  Real 
world trademarks, on the other hand, rely on businesses to develop 
associations between the product and the company through the types of 
cases listed above.  Trademark holders either develop the association by 
going to the consumer, or by potential consumers going to the market 
where the trademark already exists. In either of these real world cases, 
there is no association for the consumer in a jurisdiction until that 
association is developed.  Although some virtual world users are likely 
to come from real world territories where trademarks at issue in the 
virtual world have not yet entered their real world market, the dominant 
concern for trademark holders remains how virtual worlds protect 
trademarks. 
Whether Blackstone’s or Locke’s theory of property possession best 
applies to trademarks in virtual worlds like Second Life is largely 
influenced by whether Second Life is viewed as a separate jurisdiction 
governed by the principle of territoriality or is an extension of the real 
life world in which the virtual world is created.  Carrying the principle of 
 
131. Id. at 7.  Eros may not have morality on its side as it enters this lawsuit.  The 
SexGen product line allows Second Life users to engage in virtual sex within Second Life.  
These products have proven popular within the Second Life community as Eros’s founder 
Kevin Alderman claims $1 million in total revenue from the Eros product line.  David 
Kravets, Linden Lab Targeted in Second Life Sex-Code Lawsuit, WIRED, Sept. 17, 2009, 
available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/linden/.  
132. Complaint at 8, Eros LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., 09-CV-04269-PJH. 
133. Id. at 11–12. 
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territoriality to virtual worlds and treating those worlds as separate 
jurisdictions clarifies where trademark protections stop.  The trademark 
holder in a different jurisdiction then understands it must undertake 
new efforts to gain trademark protection in the virtual world.  
Eliminating the principle of territoriality from virtual worlds, on the 
other hand, increases the uncertainty over who possesses a mark 
because avatars are controlled by individuals who already attribute 
trademarks to certain sources.  Virtual worlds should not be governed 
by the principle of territoriality because preventing consumer confusion 
is the primary aim of a trademark. 
Blackstone’s clear-act principle to acquire property is best applied to 
trademarks in a virtual world when the principle of territoriality is 
applied to treat the virtual world as a separate jurisdiction.  If the 
principle of territoriality carries into the virtual world, then the initial 
acts of potential trademark holders to develop their products in virtual 
spaces takes on more significant meaning to gain possession of those 
marks.  With significantly less people in the virtual world than real life,134 
each use of a mark strongly declares that the mark for a product 
indicates a certain source.  The use of a mark strongly declares an entity 
possesses a trademark in densely populated areas of the virtual world 
because a mark’s use is witnessed by more avatars.  Absent the principle 
of territoriality, Blackstone’s clear-act theory is left vulnerable to the 
same problems outlined above.135 
In the case of Eros, the clear act likely occurred with its first use in 
January 2005.  This time is when the SexGen mark was first used and 
was within a matter of months from when Linden Lab created the 
Second Life world.  Few products of its kind were likely sold within the 
Second Life universe at the time.  Those individuals encountering these 
products were likely to cross Eros’s trademark and strongly associate 
the SexGen product line with the SexGen mark.  In such a young world 
with few inhabitants, Eros’s use of the SexGen mark acted as a clear act 
and declared to inhabitants of Second Life that the SexGen product line 
associated with the SexGen mark and Eros. 
 
134. Not only is there fewer than one million unique users on Second Life, but its 
growth to that number has occurred in a relatively short period of time.  The beta version of 
second life was opened in late 2002 with the consumer version available the following year.  
Press Release, Linden Lab, Linden Lab Announces Name of New Online World ‘Second 
Life’ and Availability of Beta Program, (Oct. 30, 2002) available at 
http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/02_10_30. 
135. See Section III(B). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Trademark law’s importance has grown as national economies 
expand into global economies.  As trademark’s role in our world has 
grown, so has the discussion of treating a holder’s interest in a mark as 
real property.  The McCurry and Grupo Gigante cases demonstrate the 
tension in treating trademark strictly as a tort and how that tension is 
relieved when trademark is treated as property.  By applying 
Blackstone’s and Locke’s theories to these situations, it is evident that 
Locke’s labor theory best captures the original purpose of trademark 
law.  Locke’s theory is especially well suited when one further considers 
that although our world operates in a global economy, we still 
stringently adhere to the principle of territoriality.  An exception lies 
where a new world is created that abides by the principal of 
territoriality.  In that narrow case, the Blackstone theory of property 
acquisition has a role to play to determine who owns a trademark. 
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